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The information presented in this white paper suggests a number of potential avenues for future research in the area of phishing attacks and we would recommend further investigation of the following subjects:
We would like to investigate if honeypots can be used to help in the fight against spammers and phishers. One possible research project would be to deploy additional honeypots of a type regularly used in previously observed phishing attacks or tuned to present attractive targets to spammers (such as SMTP open relays). Analysis of further attacks against these systems would help us to learn more about the anatomy of phishing attacks, particularly in the area of phishing using botnets, and to track the evolution of phishing techniques. Another research possibility would be to further develop the idea of honeypots and produce "client-side honeypots". This type of next-generation honeypot would actively participate in communication networks, for example, by automatically follow links in spam emails and accessing the target content. Client-side honeypots could idle in IRC-channels or share/download files via peer-to-peer networks, further improving our knowledge about the type of threats present in these communication networks.
In addition, we would like to investigate potential methods of countering or stopping phishing attacks. Since the time window between the start and end of a phishing attack is likely to be limited to a matter of only hours or days, and the source hosts are widely distributed, this is a difficult task. Current research efforts in this area (for example The AntiPhishing Group and PhishReport) concentrate on collecting phishing emails received by end users. Whilst this is a viable approach, capture occurs at the final stage in the incident lifecycle. An automated approach to capturing and responding to phishing attacks would be more desirable.
We suspect that accounts and passwords are being traded between blackhat groups, probably via IRC. Honeynet technology could be used to capture such communication and further understand phishing activities. In addition, phishing tools often appear to be downloaded from a number of regularly updated central web or FTP servers. Although more contentious, monitoring of such activity or contacting the system owners would help to prevent some phishing activity, and a framework for operating such research and potential countermeasures could be established.
Further work is required to improve the automation of incident analysis, particularly in automatic profiling of data captured during such attacks. Automation of traffic and IP address extraction, reverse DNS and IP block ownership lookups, per IP address or per domain traffic summaries and en-masse passive operating system fingerprinting would all be particularly useful when analysing large data sets, as would a local forensic database of known hosts, attackers, attack signatures, message contents, etc. In the longer term, agreed standards for sharing such information and a global forensic database to support analysis of distributed blackhat activities would be highly desirable and of significant benefit to the community.