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The Conpot team is following closely the latest developments in Honeypot research and the methods and technologies used. If you look at the topics presented on security conferences, you might have also noticed an increased interest in ICS security and honeypot technologies in the last two years. One presentation from this years Blackhat’15 conference caught my attention also knowing previous research done by Kyle and Stephen: “The little pump gauge that could: Attacks against gas pump monitoring systems” [link] If you are interested in their findings, I recommend their white paper: “The GasPot Experiment: Unexamined Perils in Using Gas-Tank-Monitoring Systems“ [link, pdf] by Kyle Wilhoit and Stephen Hilt from Trend Micro’s Forward-Looking Threat Research team.
So we had the great idea to add exactly that feature to Conpot...
The team working on the ICS/SCADA honeypot Conpot, just merged in a more mature support for STIX (Structured Threat Information eXpression) formatted reporting via TAXII (Trusted Automated eXchange of Indicator Information) into the master branch on Github.
We proudly announce the first release of our Industrial Control System honeypot named Conpot.
Until now setting up an ICS honeypot required substantial manual work, real systems which are usually either inaccessible or expensive and lecture of quite tedious protocol specifications. With implementing a master server for a larger set of common industrial communication protocols and virtual slaves which are easy to configure, we provide an easy entry into the analysis of threats against industrial infrastructures and control systems.